Indian And Pakistan Stockpiling Nuclear Weapons At A Rapid Rate

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India and Pakistan, are stockpiling nuclear weapons at a rapid pace. Trying to out do each other the two nations have added an almost identical 20 to 30 warheads in the last one year, a leading Swedish think tank said Tuesday.

Country	Deployed warheads*	Other warheads	Total 2011	Total 2010
USA	2150	6350	8500	9600
Russia	2427	8570	11000	12000
UK	160	65	225	225
France	290	10	300	300
China		200	240	240
India		80-100	80-110	60-80
Pakistan		90-110	90-110	70-90
Israel		80	80	80
Total	5027	15500	20530	22600

In its yearbook for 2011, the Stockholm International Peace Research Insitute (SIPRI) also pointed out that India and Pakistan continued with the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, estimated to be 110 warheads with each of the countries.

India, said the SIPRI yearbook, currently holds about 80 to 110 nuclear warheads, about 30 more than its estimated to be 60-80 a year ago. Pakistan too boasts of about 90 to 110 warheads, up by 20 warheads from 70-90 in 2010.

"India and Pakistan, which along with Israel, are de facto nuclear weapons states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), continue to develop new ballistic and cruise missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They are also expanding their capacities to produce fissile material for military purposes," the yearbook, released in Stockholm, said.

India has no means for officially releasing data on its nuclear weapons stock, but SIPRI's estimates seem to be based on calculations of the country's inventory of weapons-grade plutonium as well as the number of operational nuclear-capable delivery systems.

India currently operates 20 nuclear reactors, mostly meant for civilian energy use. Pakistan operates two plutonium production reactors, and construction work on two more such facilities appears to be under way.

While India has maintained a "no first use" policy for its nuclear weapons ever since it declared itself a nuclear weapons state following its 1998 Pokhran tests, Pakistan has not pronounced its intentions of not using its strategic weapons first if there is a sub-continental conflict.

SIPRI's yearbook also noted that the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel possessed more than 20,530 nuclear weapons as of January 2011, a drop of 2,130 from 2010.

Of these, 5,027 are deployed and are ready to fire, including nearly 2,000 that are kept in a state of high operational alert, it said, adding that 2,150 of these are with the US, 2,427 with Russia, 160 with Britain and 290 with France.

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Pakistani Perspective On The Day India Tested The Nuclear Bomb

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Brigadier Samson Simon Sharaf
Be warned there is a lot of rubbish in the article below. It sounds more like a self-propaganda than anything else. The favorite phrase of the author seems to be "we knew". I think the article is written by a person who wallows in self-delusion and grandiose vision of self-importance. So take everything with more than a pinch of salt.

When Narasimha Rao, the Indian National Congress Prime Minister called for snap elections in 1996, it was time for Pakistan to brace itself for the events particularly if BJP came to power. BJP had posed serious challenges to the INC coalition on charges of corruption and was poised to electioneer on issues that were most endearing to the philosophy of BHARAT VERSHA. Pre election opinion polls indicated that BJP was most likely to emerge as the single largest party. The most challenging question for Pakistan’s security planners was; would BJP follow its rhetoric of nuclear testing if it came to power?

As destiny would have it, I was the only officer in the General Staff with sound academic credentials in Nuclear Proliferation and Strategy. Though the study was simultaneously being carried out by many concerned branches, the ultimate responsibility of carrying out the final analysis for the General Staff in GHQ fell on my shoulders. Destiny placed me in the footsteps of a great Pakistani diplomat, Mr. S M Burke, who had been most instrumental in procuring Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor from Canada.

To carry out an accurate study, it was time for an in depth appraisal of known Indian nuclear capabilities and development. The first step in the study was to pin point the deficiencies in India’s technical nuclear capabilities and what were they most likely to do to address them. Within a week, my team had read through and sifted extremely important findings about the Indian Nuclear and Space Development Program.
We knew that the explosion in 1974 was a conventional 1950 design and needed to be fine tuned for confirmation and miniaturization.

We knew that based on decay rates, India needed further data not only to confirm its previous testing but also calculate the life of the war heads.We knew that though India was already refining plutonium, the fissile material had never been tested in an explosion and the subsequent data crucial to war head designs.
We knew that the war head designs had to be compact so as to be placed in the tips of the delivery systems. Boosted weapons and miniaturization were therefore a necessity.

Simultaneously, through the recently introduced internet, we got a special connection and hooked on to a satellite that transmitted pictures of Pokhran with a 48 hours delay. Initially there was no activity but by February 1998, we began noticing track marks and considerable activity. We estimated three months before India could resume nuclear testing.

At the same time we continued receiving inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic chatter and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan. These bits and pieces were accurately fitting into our knowledge base and the photography. By mid February, the analysis was ready and subjected to an in house discussion in the General Staff Branch after which it was put before the COAS, General Jehanghir Karamat. The preparations in Pakistan began.

Due to India’s limited capability in enriching uranium and processing plutonium, we had reached the conclusion that India will conduct the following explosions.

• A repeat of 1974 design for confirmation.
• A boosted weapon system based on a plutonium design.
• A two stage thermo nuclear testing with the first stage based on a conventional design or a boosted weapon to produce the heat necessary for a nuclear fusion.
• We were of the opinion that cognisant of depleting fissile material stockpiles, India would not carry out more than three tests but at the same time test warhead designs without the fissile material.

I was on a physical workout on 12Th May 1998 when Director General Military Operations Major General Tauqir Zia called me to inform that India had carried out some nuclear explosions. Glued to the ZEE News, we saw the breaking news. There was no surprise and we worked for the next 48 hours. These 48 hours in the planning room were the best I had amongst senior officers. There was indeed urgency but no air of typical military seniority. We were all one, taking turns and handing out refreshments to each other irrespective of our ranks.

In days to come, the accuracy of our study was vindicated. The graphs of our monitoring stations indicated three major bangs, the last one flattening out. The first was a fission reaction of considerable yield. The second indicated a smaller yield confirming it was plutonium based boosted weapon.

For my team, it was a moment of extreme satisfaction, pride and humility. Based on research, conclusions drawn through empiricism and important intelligence gathering, we had ensured that Pakistan was not caught napping. We had given enough lead time to our scientists to prepare and conduct a series of nuclear testing as a credible and befitting response. All this would never have been possible without the confidence that senior officers reposed in us and the guidance of Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, the Chairman of the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Qaid e Azam University Islamabad.

With technical issues left to our scientists, engineers and logisticians, it was now time to carry out an in depth appraisal of the international reaction and budgetary consequences for Pakistan. It was also time to lay the foundations of a Nuclear Policy and Doctrine that would ensure a durable peace in the region and foresee a negotiated settlement of all disputes with India.

One of the most important conclusions of our study was that the post nuclear Pakistan had to be more responsible. The message went unnoticed by the political establishment. General Jehanghir Karamat had proposed a Committee of Defence and National Security (CDNS) as the single competent forum to pull Pakistan out of its political and economic crises. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif saw it as an affront to the political establishment and a precursor to praetorianism. Being a gentleman that he was, General Karamat resigned and with him the vision of a peaceful, self reliant and strong Pakistan.

With the new COAS, Pakistan soon changed course and the coterie plunged Pakistan into its deepest crises one after the other. I wonder if it would ever be possible to put back the clock

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Latest USA Russia Nuclear Arsenal Data Released

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The United States has 30 percent more deployed long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads than former Cold War foe Russia, according to new data released Wednesday by the State Department.

Both countries are required to report key figures from their nuclear weapons arsenals as part of the landmark new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) adopted by Moscow and Washington on February 5.

The United States has 882 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers, compared with 521 for Russia, according to the State Department, which published the new START aggregate numbers.

The United States also has 1,800 deployed warheads and 1,124 launchers, as well as deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, compared with Russia's 1,537 deployed warheads and 865 launchers and heavy bombers, according to the figures.

The figures are current as of February 5, 2011, "as drawn from the initial exchange of data by the parties" that was required within 45 days of the treaty coming into force.

The new START limits each side to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers, meaning the United States would still need to reduce its arsenal under the terms of the treaty.

The first nuclear pact in two decades has been feted as vital to global security because it reduces old warhead ceilings by 30 percent from a limit set in 2002, and establishes a streamlined new inspection procedure designed to eliminate cheating.

In October 2009, two months before the end of the original START treaty, the State Department issued strategic offensive arms figures that showed the United States possessed 5,916 "attributed" warheads, compared to Russia's 3,897.

A person familiar with START described it as a "totally different counting system" than the new START, which uses a more accurate counting in listing 1,800 actually deployed US warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs or heavy bombers.

A more realistic comparison, the person told AFP, would be with the approximately 2,150 operationally deployed strategic US nuclear warheads listed as of last December.

In May 2010, after extensive debate within President Barack Obama's administration, the Pentagon revealed the extent of its nuclear arsenal for the first time.

It said the US stockpile of nuclear weapons consisted of 5,113 warheads, including active warheads ready for deployment at short notice, as well as "inactive" warheads maintained at a depot in a non-operational status.

The new START accord limits still allow for enough weaponry to blow up the world many times over.Obama has described the treaty as a modest step toward "a world without nuclear weapons," but stressed he knew the goal would not be reached quickly and would take "patience and persistence."

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New Study on Pakistani Nukes

  

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal now totals more than 100 deployed weapons, a doubling of its stockpile over the past several years in one of the world's most unstable regions, according to estimates by non-government analysts.

The Pakistanis have significantly accelerated production of uranium and plutonium for bombs and developed new weapons to deliver them. After years of approximate weapons parity, experts said, Pakistan has now edged ahead of India, its nuclear-armed rival.

An escalation of the South Asian arms race poses a dilemma for the Obama administration, which has worked to improve its economic, political and defense ties with India, while seeking to deepen its relationship with Pakistan as a crucial component of its Afghanistan war strategy.

In politically fragile Pakistan, the administration is caught between fears of proliferation or possible terrorist attempts to seize nuclear materials and Pakistani suspicions that the United States aims to control or limit its weapons program and favors India.

Those suspicions were on public display last week at the opening session of U.N. disarmament talks in Geneva, where Pakistani Ambassador Zamir Akram accused the United States and other major powers of "double standards and discrimination" for pushing a global treaty banning all future production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

Adoption of what is known as the "fissile materials cutoff treaty," a key element of President Obama's worldwide non-proliferation agenda, requires international consensus. Pakistan has long been the lone holdout.

While Pakistan has produced more nuclear-armed weapons, India is believed to have larger existing stockpiles of such fissile material for future weapons. That long-term Indian advantage, Pakistan has charged, was further enhanced by a 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The administration has deflected Pakistan's demands for a similar deal.

Brig. Gen. Nazir Butt, defense attache at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, said the number of Pakistan's weapons and the status of its production facilities were confidential.

"Pakistan lives in a tough neighborhood and will never be oblivious to its security needs," Butt said. "As a nuclear power, we are very confident of our deterrent capabilities."

But the administration's determination to bring the fissile materials ban to completion this year may compel it to confront more directly the issue of proliferation in South Asia. As U.S. arms negotiator Rose Gottemoeller told Bloomberg news at the U.N. conference Thursday: "Patience is running out."

Other nuclear powers have their own interests in the region. China, which sees India as a major regional competitor, has major investments in Pakistan and a commitment to supply it with at least two nuclear-energy reactors.

Russia has increased its cooperation with India and told Pakistan last week that it was "disturbed" about its arms buildup.

"It's a risky path, particularly for a government under pressure," Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, fresh from a visit to Islamabad, said during remarks at the Nixon Center on Thursday.

Wary of upsetting Pakistan's always-fragile political balance, the White House rarely mentions the country's arsenal in public except to voice confidence in its strong internal safeguards, with warheads kept separate from delivery vehicles. But the level of U.S. concern was reflected during last month's White House war review, when Pakistan's nuclear security was set as one of two long-term strategy objectives there, along with the defeat of al-Qaeda, according to a senior administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

A publicly released summary of the classified review document made no reference to the nuclear issue, and the White House deflected questions on grounds that it was an intelligence matter. This week, a spokesman said the administration would not respond to inquiries about the size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor referred to Obama's assurance at last spring's Nuclear Security Summit that he felt "confident about Pakistan's security around its nuclear weapons program." Vietor noted that Obama hs encouraged "all nations" to support negotiations on the fissile cutoff treaty.

"The administration is always trying to keep people from talking about this knowledgeably," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security and a leading analyst on the world's nuclear forces. "They're always trying to downplay" the numbers and insisting that "it's smaller than you think."

"It's hard to say how much the U.S. knows," said Hans M. Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists and author of the annual global nuclear weapons inventory published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. "Probably a fair amount. But it's a mixed bag - Pakistan is an ally, and they can't undercut it with a statement of concern in public."

Beyond intelligence on the ground, U.S. officials assess Pakistan's nuclear weapons program with the same tools used by the outside experts - satellite photos of nuclear-related installations, estimates of fissile-material production and weapons development, and publicly available statements and facts.

Four years ago, the Pakistani arsenal was estimated at 30 to 60 weapons.

"They have been expanding pretty rapidly," Albright said. Based on recently accelerated production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, "they could have more than doubled in that period," with current estimates of up to 110 weapons.

Kristensen said it was "not unreasonable" to say that Pakistan has now produced at least 100 weapons. Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Britain's University of Bradford, put the number at between 100 and 110.

Some Pakistani officials have intimated they have even more. But just as the United States has a vested interest in publicly downplaying the total, Pakistan sees advantage in "playing up the number of weapons they've got," Gregory said. "They're at a disadvantage with India with conventional forces," in terms of both weaponry and personnel.

Only three nuclear countries - Pakistan, India and Israel - have never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. India is estimated to have 60 to 100 weapons; numbers are even less precise for Israel's undeclared program, estimated at up to 200. North Korea, which has conducted nuclear tests and is believed to have produced enough fissile material for at least a half-dozen bombs, withdrew from the treaty in 2003.
Those figures make Pakistan the world's fifth largest nuclear power, ahead of "legal" powers France and Britain. The vast bulk of nuclear stockpiles are held by the United States and Russia, followed by China.

While Pakistan has no declared nuclear doctrine, it sees its arsenal as a deterrent to an attack by the Indian forces that are heavily deployed near its border. India has vowed no first-use of nuclear weapons, but it depends on its second-strike capability to deter the Pakistanis.

The United States imposed nuclear-related sanctions on both Pakistan and India after weapons tests in 1998, but lifted them shortly after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. With U.S. guidance and a $100 million assistance program, Pakistan moved to increase international confidence by overhauling its command and control structures.

Revelations in 2004 about an illegal international nuclear procurement network run by Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, which supplied nuclear materials to Libya, Iran and North Korea, led to further steps to improve security.

The 2008 agreement that permits India to purchase nuclear fuel for civilian purposes was a spur to Pakistani weapons production, experts said. Pakistan maintains that the treaty allows India to divert more of its own resources for military use.

As Pakistan sees India becoming a great power, "nuclear weapons become a very attractive psychological equalizer," said George Perkovich, vice president for studies and a non-proliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The 1998 test date is a quasi-holiday in Pakistan, and the test site was once declared a national monument, part of the nuclear chest-thumping that, along with political instability, makes U.S. officials as nervous as the actual number of weapons.

In December 2008, Peter Lavoie, the U.S. national intelligence officer for South Asia, told NATO officials that "despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world," according to a classified State Department cable released late last year by the Internet site WikiLeaks.

Publication of the document so angered Pakistani army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani that he told journalists there that the "real aim of U.S. [war] strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan," according to local media reports.

In 2009, Congress passed a $7.5 billion aid package for Pakistan with the stipulation that the administration provide regular assessments of whether any of the money "directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."

While continuing to produce of weapons-grade uranium at two sites, Pakistan has sharply increased its production of plutonium, allowing it to make lighter warheads for more mobile delivery systems. Its newest missile, the Shaheen II, has a range of 1,500 miles and is about to go into operational deployment, Kristensen said. Pakistan also has developed nuclear-capable land- and air-launched cruise missiles.

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